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We investigate the output effects of severe banking and currency crises in emerging markets, 
focusing on whether “twin crises” (simultaneous occurrence of currency and banking crises) exist 
as a unique phenomenon and whether they entail especially large losses. Recent literature, mostly 
relating to the East Asian crisis, emphasizes the interplay and reinforcement between currency 
and banking crises, presumably making twin crises particularly damaging to the real economy. 
Using a panel data set over the 1975-97 period and covering 24 emerging-market economies, we 
find that twin crises do not contribute any additional (marginal) negative impact on output 
growth. That is, twin crises do not adversely impact output over and above the independent 
effects associated with a currency and banking crisis taken together. We find that currency 
(banking) crises are very damaging, reducing output by about 5-8 (8-10) percent over a two-four 
year period. The cumulative output loss of both types of crises occurring at the same time is 
therefore very large, around 13-18 percent, and should alarm policymakers. However, twin crises 
are “bad” only in that they entail output losses associated with both currency and banking crises, 
not because there are additional feedback or interactive effects further damaging the economy. 
This result is robust to alternative model specifications, lag structures and using IV and GMM 
estimation procedures that correct bias associated with simultaneity and estimation of dynamic 









Severe financial crises occur with some frequency in emerging-market economies— more 
than 51 (33) currency (banking) crises episodes over the past 25 years and 20 occurrences of 
“twin crises” (currency and banking crises that occurred simultaneously, shown in Appendix A). 
Moreover, this frequency of financial crises appears to be a reoccurring phenomenon, persistent 
over time and across regions of the world (Bordo et al., 2001; Glick and Hutchison, 2001). A 
large and growing empirical literature attempts to explain the factors that cause currency, banking 
and twin crises, as well as their timing, on the basis of macroeconomic, institutional and 
structural factors. See, for example, Arteta and Eichengreen, forthcoming; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 1998; Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz, 1995; Frankel and Rose, 1996; Glick and 
Hutchison, 2001; Hutchison and McDill, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; and Sachs, Tornell 
and Velasco, 1996.  
Recent theoretical literature emphasizes the potential impact of financial crises on output 
growth. A sharp devaluation (currency/balance of payments crisis) may have a contractionary 
effect on output, working through such channels as a wealth effect on aggregate demand, higher 
production costs, disruption in credit markets, or a sudden cessation in capital inflows limiting 
imported capital goods
1. Banking crises may have adverse effects on output by disrupting the 
process of credit intermediation
2. Any number of factors may induce a banking crisis (e.g. 
exogenous shock reducing the collateral value of assets, sunspot bank runs, and so on), and the 
transmission to the real economy may take the form of a financial accelerator, credit constraints, 
decrease in collateral values, disruption in the payments system, bankruptcies and other channels 
(e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Bernanke et al., 1996; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997). There is 
also an emerging theoretical literature linking banking and currency crises, and how these twin 4 
 
crises may emerge—where the initial disturbance could emanate from a currency crisis, a bank 
crisis, or a common shock to both sectors (Glick and Hutchison, 2001).  
However, there is no simple theoretical rationale for why a twin crisis need have an adverse 
effect on the economy greater than the cumulative effect of a currency and banking crisis 
measured separately. Clearly, the simultaneous occurrence of a currency and banking crisis could 
have disruptive effects on the real economy working through currency exposure and bank balance 
sheets, bank runs, and disruption in international credit markets and capital flows (e.g. Chang and 
Velasco, 1999; Dekle and Kletzer, 2001; Goldfajn and Valdés, 1997).  But is there something 
special about a twin crisis making output losses greater than would be anticipated simply by 
consider the additive effect of a currency and bank crisis? It is possible that feedback effects, 
contagion and linkages between domestic and international financial markets might make output 
losses of twin crises particularly severe, but difficult to model theoretically. Nonetheless, policy 
discussions attempting to explain why some economies, such as those in East Asia, seemed to 
suffer disproportionately from financial crises frequently point to the linkage between currency 
and banking crises. And casual observation would seem to bear this out.  
There is surprisingly little empirical literature, however, systematically testing the extent to 
which financial crises impact output growth and no empirical article of which we are aware that 
focuses on twin crises. A few articles, reviewed in Section 2, consider the impact of either a 
currency or a banking crisis separately on the real economy. But we believe the key issue 
regarding the impact of twin crises is the marginal output growth effect of a simultaneous 
occurrence of a currency and banking crisis.
3 In particular, in this study we ask whether output 
losses associated with a twin crisis are significantly greater than would have been predicted by 
the combined effect of a currency and banking crisis measured independently. That this question 5 
 
has not been fully addressed is surprising, given its enormous theoretical and policy import. 
Indeed, if there is no marginal output effect of a twin crisis, one may question whether a twin 
crisis is an interesting phenomenon in its own right. We investigate this issue directly and apply 
our analysis to answer whether East Asian output collapse in 1998 was likely associated with the 
fact that all of these nations experienced severe twin crises.   
Our objective is to test the output effects of a twin crisis by decomposing that part associated 
with a currency crisis, a banking crisis, and the interaction between the two. The latter element is 
our focus. We investigate the particular aspect of a twin crisis that may make it worse for the 
economy—as suggested by recent policy discussions-- than the typical crisis or even the 
combined effect of a currency and banking crisis treated as if they were independent events. To 
this end, we investigate output growth developments for emerging-market economies in a panel 
data set over 1975-97. We measure the impact of twin crises, carefully controlling for domestic 
and external factors, country time-invariant effects, and state of the business cycle. Simultaneity 
between financial crises and output growth is likely in this context, and we employ the fixed-
effects panel IV and GMM estimation procedures, respectively, of Hausman and Taylor (1981) 
and Arellano and Bond (1991) to address this issue.  
We concentrate our investigation on emerging markets since they are the focus of policy 
discussions and recent experiences of twin crises and output collapses. Several recent studies 
indicate that emerging markets may be different with respect to the factors that make them 
susceptible to a financial crisis (Glick and Hutchison, 2001) and how they respond to them (IMF, 
1998). Specifically, emerging markets tend to be open to international capital inflows, and have 
experienced large private capital inflows that are typically short-term. This debt is also usually 
denominated in foreign currency (generally the US$). These large short-term foreign-currency 6 
 
debt positions increase the vulnerability of these economies to swings in exchange rates and 
cessation of new capital to roll over existing debt (the “sudden stop” syndrome of Calvo, 1998). 
Emerging markets therefore appear most vulnerable to twin crises and, potentially, their adverse 
consequences.  
Section 2 reviews the empirical literature on financial crises and highlights our contribution 
to the literature. Section 3 presents the basic empirical model. Section 4 discusses the data 
employed in the study. Section 5 reports before/after (currency, banking and twin crises) 
summary statistics on key macroeconomic variables and the primary empirical results of the 
study. This section presents estimation results of the output equations, model dynamics and 
robustness checks.  Section 6 presents predictions for output development in the East Asian crisis 
obtained by simulating our empirical results for the out-of-sample data for the five Asian 1998 
crisis countries. Section 7 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature on the Output Costs of Currency and Banking Crises 
  Several studies in the literature investigate the output costs of currency crises, but very 
few systematically analyze the costs of banking crises or both forms of crises taken together. 
Most important for our purposes, no studies of which we are aware measure the feedback and 
interactive affect on output arising from a twin crisis.    
Most of the limited empirical literature on the output costs of currency and balance of 
payments crises focus on single crisis episodes (e.g. Calvo and Mendoza, 1996; Lane and 
Phillips, 1999) or on episodes that are known to have been contractionary (e.g. Calvo and 
Reinhart, 1999). Exceptions that analyse output developments around the time of a currency 7 
 
crisis in a broad sample of countries are Aziz et al. (2000), Barro (2001), Bordo et al. (2001), 
Gupta et al. (2000) and Milesi-Ferretti and Razin (2000).  
McDill (2000) and Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2001) focus on the output cost of a banking crisis.  
McDill (2000) investigates the effect of banking crises on a panel data set comprising industrial, 
emerging and developing economies. She regresses output growth on contemporaneous banking 
crises and several control variables (lagged exchange rate depreciation, the real interest rate, 
lagged money growth and lagged change in stock price). She finds that banking crises are 
associated with 1.2-1.8 percentage point decline in output growth during each year of the banking 
crisis.  Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2000) consider a cross-section of 36 banking crises, investigating 
macroeconomic developments before, during and after crisis episodes. They test differences in 
the developments of each variable (e.g. output growth) during these different periods (before, 
during and after) using a regression that accounts for heterogeneity across countries. They find 
that a banking crisis is associated (contemporaneously) with a 4-percentage point decline in 
output growth and that growth remains depressed in the year following the crisis.  
 
Output Costs of Twin Crises 
  Barro (2001) and Bordo et al. (2001) are the only papers of which we are aware that 
attempt to measure the output cost of a currency crisis and a banking crisis in the same model. 
Barro (2001), however, measures the effects of these crises separately—the twin crisis 
phenomenon is not investigated. Bordo et al. (2001) consider the output costs of twin crises, but 
measure this phenomenon independently of currency and banking crises.   
Specifically, Barro (2001) considers the pattern of 5-year average output growth in a 
broad panel data set covering industrial, emerging and developing economies.  He regresses 5-8 
 
year output growth on conventional control variables (e.g. per capita GDP, schooling, life 
expectancy) and contemporaneous and lagged currency and banking crises. The crisis variable 
measures a (1,0) dummy for a crisis occurrence anytime during the focal 5-year period. He finds 
that a currency (banking) crisis is associated with a 1.3 percentage point decline (0.6 percent 
decline) in average output growth over the 5-year period. He concludes that the combination of a 
currency and a banking crisis reduces growth contemporaneously by about 2 percent per year. 
4 
Bordo et al. (2001), in work most closely related to our own article, conduct a cross 
sectional investigation of the effect of both kinds of financial crises and their ‘twin’ effect on 
recessions. For their modern (1973-1997) sample, they find that the cumulative output loss for a 
‘twin’ crisis over and above the average recession is 16% of GDP. This effect is measured 
separately from the 13% cumulative output loss that is found to be the combined effect of a 
banking and currency crisis (4.4% and 8.7% respectively).
5 Overall, their result is ambiguous 
about the exact difference in outcomes between a ‘twin’ and a combined currency-and-banking 
crisis phenomenon.  
 
Section 3. Estimating the Effects of Currency, Banking and Twin Crises on Real Output Growth 
Our contribution is to measure the additional output cost of a twin crisis, over and above 
that that may be associated with currency and banking crises viewed as separate phenomena. 
Unlike other literature in this area, we also control for simultaneity issues, and biases associated 
with estimation of fixed-effects dynamic panel data models. Estimating this model for emerging 
market economies, we are also able to address whether twins are especially problematic in 
general terms and whether the deep recession in East Asia was typical of the “bad” outcome of a 
twin crisis.  9 
 
Our methodological approach begins by explaining output growth in emerging markets by 
a standard set of variables as well as currency, banking and twin crises. The determinants of 
output in this model are a set of domestic policy, structural, and external factors, as well as 
country-specific effects and lagged output growth. Domestic policy factors are changes in 
government budget surpluses and credit growth. External factors are growth in foreign output and 
real exchange rate overvaluation. The structural factor we consider is the openness of the 
economy to international trade. Country-specific effects are introduced in order to account for the 
widely varying growth experiences in our set of emerging-market economies over the past 25 
years. All of the variables, with the exception of foreign output, are introduced with a one-year 
lag in order to capture the delayed response of output to macroeconomic developments. This 
formulation of the model also avoids the potential for biased coefficient estimates on the 
domestic policy variables due to feedback effects from output growth to policy formulation 
(simultaneous equation bias). Our main concern in this context is to introduce relevant control 
variables into the regression equation so that the identified impact of a crisis on output growth is 
not simply due to omitted-variables bias. 
In the context of our “benchmark” model, we test for the additional effect on output 
growth arising from a currency, banking and twin crises. We consider both lagged and 
contemporaneous effects of crises on output growth, and also estimate several variants of the 
model, including changes in the lag structure and definition of crises, to check the robustness of 
the basic results. The coefficient estimates on our crises measures may be interpreted as the 
marginal effects of crises, after controlling for several of the other factors that may influence the 
evolution of output growth.          10 
 
The formal specification of the empirical model is as follows. The growth of real GDP for 
the ith country at time t ( it y ) is explained by policy variables ( ) 1 ( − t i x ); external and structural 
factors ( ) (⋅ i w ); the recent occurrence of a currency or a banking crisis (
CC
i D ) (⋅ , 
BK
i D ) (⋅ ), a 'twin' crisis 
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Policy reaction function: 
where x is a k-element vector of policy variables for country i at time t, w is an h-element vector 
of external variables for country i at times (t or t-1),  CC
t i D ) ( is a dummy variable equal to unity if 
the country has recently experienced a currency crisis or balance of payments crisis (and zero 
otherwise) and likewise for a banking and twin crises.  it ε  is a zero mean, fixed variance, 
disturbance term.  0 µ is a vector of country effects (allowing average growth rates to vary across 
countries in the sample),  k β is a k-element vector measuring the impact of policy changes on 
output,  h α  is an h-element vector measuring the impact of exogenous factors on output, and 
CC β , 
BK β  and 
TW β measure the output growth effects of currency, banking and twin crises 
respectively.  
  In our main estimates we follow a procedure first suggested by Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) that takes into account the bias in estimation of a dynamic panel with predetermined and 
endogenous variables (for a rigorous formulation of this bias, see Nickel, 1981). This three-step 
estimation methodology is an instrumental variable estimator that takes into account the possible 
correlation between the independent variables and the individual country-specific effects, as well 
possible simultaneity issues running from output growth (our dependent variable) and currency, 11 
 
banking and twin crises (three of the explanatory variables). When a correlation exists between the 
independent variables and the individual country-specific effects, estimation of a dynamic model 
creates a correlation between time-invariant country-fixed effects and the error term. A similar 
correlation between the “crisis” explanatory variables and the error term exists when output 
fluctuations contribute to the onset of a crisis.  
  In the first step, least squares estimates (with fixed effects) are employed to obtain consistent 
but inefficient estimates for the variance components for the coefficients of the time-varying 
variables. In the second step, an FGLS procedure is employed to obtain variances for the time-
invariant variables. The third step is a weighted IV estimation using deviation from means of lagged 
values of the time-varying variables as instruments.
6 The procedure requires specifying which 
explanatory variables are to be treated as endogenous. In our specification, the endogenous 
explanatory variables are the three binary crisis measures (currency, banking and twin) and 
consideration is also taken for the lagged dependent variable.
7   
  While the Hausman-Taylor (HT) procedure provides asymptotically unbiased estimates, a 
recent literature suggests it is not the most efficient estimator possible. A more efficient General 
Methods of Moments (GMM) procedure relies on utilizing more available moment conditions to 
obtain a more efficient estimation (e.g., Ahn and Schmidt, 1995; and Arellano and Bond, 1991 and 
1998).
8 This procedure, however, is usually employed in estimation of panels with a large number of 
individuals and short time-series such as in the literature on long-run growth (Bond et al., 2001). In 
our case, the data makes this procedure difficult to implement for most specifications of the model. 
We provide results using the Arellano and Bond (1998) GMM framework and show that our 
coefficients to do not change noticeably when compared to the benchmark Hausman and Taylor 
(1981) estimates.
9  12 
 
 
Section 4. Data Description 
Defining Currency and Balance of Payments Crises  
Our indicator of currency and balance of payments crises is constructed by identifying “large” 
values in an index of currency pressure, defined as a weighted average of monthly real exchange 
rate changes and monthly (percent) international reserve losses.
10 Following convention (e.g. 
Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) the weights are inversely related to the variance of changes of 
each component over the sample for each country. This excludes some large depreciations that 
occur during high inflation episodes, but it avoids screening out sizeable depreciation events in 
more moderate inflation periods for countries that have occasionally experienced periods of 
hyperinflation and extreme devaluation.
11 Our measure, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2000 
and 2001), presumes that any nominal currency changes or reserve changes associated with 
exchange rate pressure should affect the purchasing power of the domestic currency, i.e. result in 
a change in the real exchange rate (at least in the short run). An episode of serious exchange rate 
pressure, i.e. a standard crisis episode, is defined as a value in the index—a threshold point-- that 
exceeds the mean plus 2 times the country-specific standard deviation, provided that it also 
exceeds 5 percent.
12 The first condition insures that, relative to its own history, unusually large 
values of the index of currency pressure are counted as a crisis while the second condition 
attempts to screen out values that are insufficiently large in an economic (real) sense.  
For each country-year in our sample, we construct binary measures of currency crises, as 
defined above (1 = crisis, 0 = no crisis). A currency crisis is deemed to have occurred for a given 
year if the currency pressure index for any month of that year satisfies our criteria. To reduce the 
chances of capturing the continuation of the same currency crisis episode, we impose windows on 13 
 
our data. In particular, after identifying each “large” indication of currency pressure, we treat any 
similar threshold point reached in the following 24-month window as a part of the same currency 
episode and skip the years of that change before continuing the identification of new crises. With 
this methodology, we identify 51 currency crises, 68 crisis years and 42 major currency crises for 
our emerging markets dataset over the 1975-97 period (see Table 1). 
 
Defining Banking Crises  
Banking problems are usually difficult to identify empirically because of data limitations. 
The potential for a bank run is not directly observable and, once either a bank run or large-scale 
government intervention has occurred, the situation most likely will have been preceded by a 
protracted deterioration in the quality of assets held by banks. Identifying banking sector distress 
by the deterioration of bank asset quality is also difficult since direct market indicators of asset 
value are usually lacking. This is an important limitation since most banking problems in recent 
years are not associated with bank runs but with deterioration in asset quality and subsequent 
government intervention. Moreover, it is often laxity or failure of government analysis in 
identifying banking fragility, and slow follow-up action once a problem is recognized, that allows 
the situation to deteriorate to the point of a systemic crisis involving large-scale government 
intervention.  
Our measure identifies and dates episodes of banking sector distress following the criteria 
of Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, and updated on the IMF Web page) and Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998). If an episode of banking distress is identified in either study, it is included in 
our sample. If there is ambiguity over the timing of the episode, we use the dating scheme of 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) since it tends to be more specific about the precise start 14 
 
and end of each episode.
13 Major bank crises are taken from Caprio and Klingebiel and defined as 
posing a substantial threat to the entire financial system.  
Our emerging markets dataset over the 1975-97 period includes 33 banking crises, 105 
crisis years, and 21 major banking crises. Thus, the average duration of a banking crisis is 3.2 
years while the average duration of a currency crisis is only 1.3 years. 
 
Defining Twin Crises  
Our definition of twin crises, taken from Glick and Hutchison (2001), marks a crisis if the onset 
of a banking crisis occurred two years before, during, or after the onset of a currency crisis. We 
use this definition to allow for the imprecise identification of banking crises previously discussed. 
Using a narrower one-year band does not qualitatively alter our results. We identify 20 instances 
of a 'twin' crisis in our dataset. 
 
Control Variables in the Output Growth Equation 
As discussed in section 2, the domestic policy factors included in our estimation are lagged 
changes in government budgets and lagged credit growth; external factors are (trade-weighted) 
external growth rates of the G-3 and lagged index of real exchange rate overvaluation; and the 
structural factor we consider is the openness of the economy to international trade.
14 All of the 
macroeconomic data series are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s IFS CD-ROM. 
The minimum data requirements to be included in our study are that GDP figures are 
available for a minimum of 10 consecutive years over the period 1975-97. We use annual 
observations. We employ monthly data for our (real) exchange rate and international reserves 
pressure index to identify currency crises and date each by the year in which it occurs. While 15 
 
some of our control variables are available for quarterly or even monthly frequency, banking 
crises are typically identifiable only in annual data. 
  
 
Section 5. Empirical Results  
 
Conditional Probabilities for Crises Onsets 
Table 2 presents hypothesis tests on the likelihood that currency and banking crises 
(twins) are statistically independent. The hypothesis that banking and currency crisis are not 
correlated can be rejected with probability of more than 99%. For our sample, the onsets of 31% 
of banking crises were accompanied by currency turmoil. Furthermore, there is a statistically 
significant correlation between lagged banking crises and contemporaneous currency crises but 
not vice versa. This result is similar to that found in Glick and Hutchison (2001) for a dataset 
including developing countries as well as emerging markets.
15 
 
Macro Developments: Before/After Crises Statistics 
Table 3 present summary statistics on key macroeconomic developments around currency 
(upper panel) and banking (lower panel) crises. It presents before-after statistics for the standard 
definitions of ‘normal’ currency, banking, and twin crises mentioned above. Four-year windows 
are imposed on the data to clearly delineate the macroeconomic developments around the time of 
crisis.  
Our focus variable, real GDP growth, shows an average decline of about 1.3 percentage 
points in the year a currency crisis takes place, and it recovers only minimally the following year 16 
 
(by 0.3 percentage points). Average output growth goes back to its previous level two years after 
the crisis, and this upturn is statistically significant. This pattern is almost identical for standard 
and major crises (not reported for brevity). Average losses appear to be even smaller for our sub-
sample of currency crises without banking crises (reducing output growth by only 0.5 percentage 
points).  
By contrast, output developments around banking crises are striking by the very large 
costs involved (4.1 percentage points for each year of the crisis). Output growth dynamics 
surrounding twin crises are similar and appear to entail a reduction of 4.2 percentage points in the 
year of the crisis, followed by sustained depressed output for the following two year. Hence, at 
first pass, the summary statistics indicate significant and—in some cases—prolonged effects of 
financial crises and twin crises in particular. We focus on more formal tests of this proposition in 
the sub-sections below.  
Interestingly, there are no evident statistical trends in the evolution of the budget 
surplus.
16 Inflation rates trend upward starting from before the onset of either a currency or twin 
crisis, but not a banking one. More pertinent is the fact that twin crises occur more frequently in  
countries with higher inflation rates before, during and after the crisis episode when compared to 
other crisis episodes.  Our index for real exchange rate overvaluation shows dynamics that can be 
expected given the fact that it is a key element used to identify currency crises.   
      
Benchmark Model Estimates  
Table 4 presents results from our benchmark model. Judging by the adjusted R-square 
statistics, the benchmark without any of the crisis variables explains 27 percent of the variation in 
output growth. The statistically significant control variables are external output growth, real 17 
 
exchange rate overvaluation, and lagged output growth. A one- percent rise in the growth rate of 
the G-3 economies raises output growth in emerging-market economies by about, on average, 
0.3-0.4 percentage points. A rise in real exchange rate overvaluation significantly reduces output 
growth. This is noteworthy in its own right, indicating that emerging market economies should 
avoid currency overvaluation, but also because real exchange rate overvaluation is a reliable 
predictor of future currency crises (see Glick and Hutchison, 2001). However, budget changes, 
credit growth and the openness measure are not statistically significant. The coefficient estimates 
for the control variables are consistent across alternative specifications of the model reported in 
columns (1)-(5) of table 4 and in the other tables. 
Turning to the key variables of interest, the coefficient estimates reported in column (2) 
indicate that a currency crisis is associated with a contemporaneous (lagged) fall in GDP growth 
of about 2.9 (2.5) percentage points. Very similar results are obtained, but not reported for 
brevity, when including only the contemporaneous or the lagged currency crisis binary variable. 
After a two-year period, the cumulative negative effect of a currency crisis on output is about 5.5 
percent.  
Table 4 also presents more information on the dynamics of output adjustment to currency 
crises. To allow for additional lagged values, we focus attention on the currency crisis “onset”—
the initial year of the currency crisis. Column (3) reports the analogous regression to (2) using the 
onset version of the variable. Not surprisingly, since most currency crises have duration of only 
about one year, the results of columns (3) are very similar to those reported in column (2) with a 
cumulative output effect of 5.1 percentage points. Adding further lags (second, third and fourth 
year lags) to the model, reported in column 4, indicate that the contemporaneous and one-year 
ahead effects of a currency crisis remain negative and highly significant and with roughly the 18 
 
same magnitudes as reported previously. This is followed by a substantial negative, but 
statistically insignificant, effect on the second year following a crisis and eventually a 
(insignificant) positive output effect in the third- and fourth years. Thus, currency crises in 
emerging markets seem to affect output 1-2 years following a crisis. This result remains when 
some of the insignificant lags are dropped. Our results therefore do not indicate a persistent 
effect—beyond a two-year horizon-- of crises on output growth.  
We also include lead values of currency crises in the equations, shown in columns (5), to 
further investigate the dynamic responses. Only one of the lead value coefficients, the one-year 
lead value of currency crises, is statistically significant. This result indicates that a currency crisis 
tends to follow, by about a year, a decline in real output growth. On the other hand, a currency 
crisis also is associated with a further decline in output growth contemporaneously and over a 
period of two years. These model estimates suggest that, within 2-3 years, output declines 
cumulatively by almost 8 percent for an average currency crisis in an emerging-market economy. 
An important question is whether a particularly severe crisis—substantially larger than the 
normal crisis—has an especially severe effect on growth. To investigate this issue, we introduce a 
“major” currency crisis variable that is identified by a threshold point in our pressure index that 
exceeds 3-standard deviations from the mean. For brevity we do not report these results. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the output effects of a major crisis are not larger than the typical crisis 
situation. Coefficients for a version of column (3) using the major crisis measure yield 
coefficients of –2.3 and –2.8 for the contemporaneous and lagged major currency crisis variables, 
respectively. Major currency and balance of payments crises do not appear to have a substantially 
different impact on output growth than the average crisis (identified using a 2-standard deviation 
threshold).     19 
 
 
Banking and Twin Crises 
The full results for our model are reported in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the cost 
of a banking crisis with and without the inclusion of lagged and contemporaneous currency crises 
variables. In both cases, banking crises are costly: 3-3.5 percentage points of GDP growth is lost 
for each year of the crisis. As an average banking crisis lasts 3.3 years the cumulative output loss 
amounts to around 10 percent of GDP.  
Our main results are presented in columns (3)—the coefficient on the twin crisis 
interactive variable is negative but not statistically significant from zero. Furthermore, the 
coefficients on the currency and banking crises variables stay almost exactly the same (-4.2 and –
3.0 respectively). Neither does the inclusion of leads and lags for the banking crisis dummy, 
reported in column (4), change the magnitude of these coefficients.
17 
  The joint occurrence of crises has a very large average effect on output growth—
depressing GDP by about 15-18 percent over a 3-4 year period. Moreover, it appears that 
contagion between crises is a serious problem in emerging markets so that the threat (probability) 
of a twin crisis is significant given that either a banking or a currency crisis occurs (Table 2). 
However, twin crises do not seem to have any additional marginal effect on output above and 
beyond the effect of the contemporaneous occurrence of a banking and currency crisis. Twin 
crises are “bad” in that they entail output losses associated with both a currency and banking 




To check the robustness of our results we first examine whether our estimation technique, 
based on the Hausman and Taylor (1981) IV estimator, gives similar coefficient estimates from 
those obtained by the standard least squares fixed effect estimator with a White heteroscedasticity 
correction (LSDV) or the more efficient first-differenced GMM estimator suggested by Arellano 
and Bond (1991, 1998). These results are reported in Table 6 columns (1)-(3) where we also 
include the HT estimation for exactly the same sample.
18 There is very little difference between 
the coefficients obtained on our focus variables—currency and banking crises—in all three 
estimation techniques. As can be expected, the GMM estimator yields much higher t-statistics.  
We also run the same model for a larger sample including 42 developing countries as well 
as the emerging markets sample. Data availability guided our choice of additional countries.
19 
Comparisons of column (4) with column (2) in Table 6 leads us to conclude that both currency 
and banking crises have a weaker impact on output growth in our larger sample of developing 
countries-- -2.0 instead of –3.3 for lagged currency crises and –2.6 instead of –3.1 for banking 
crises. Column (5) examines the robustness of our central result. The insignificance of the 
marginal effect of a twin crisis is also evident in our larger sample of developing countries as 
well. That is, the effects of both currency and banking crises are somewhat weaker and the 
coefficient on the twin crisis variable is still insignificantly different from zero. 
In column (6) in Table 6 we investigate whether the main results are robust when the 
variables of interest are severe or major banking and currency crises. As was reported previously 
for currency crises, the severity of a banking crisis does not appear to influence its economic cost 
in terms of foregone output growth. (Of course, a severe banking crisis most probably entails 
larger fiscal costs.
20) Our central finding is indeed robust to the “major crises” specification—21 
 
major twin crises do not seem to have any statistically discernible marginal impact on output 
growth beyond the separate effects of major currency and banking crises. 
It is possible that the results reported to this point are subject to sample selection bias. 
Countries that experience a currency or banking crises may be different in important respects 
from other countries or episodes. That is, it may not be the currency/banking crisis per se but 
several other factors contributing to them that are causing the decline in output growth. This is a 
variant of the sample selection bias problem.  
  We employ Heckman’s (1979) Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR) to control for sample selection 
bias of this form. This statistic is constructed from the results of probit regressions explaining 
both currency and banking crises and added as an additional explanatory variable in the output 
growth regressions.
21 Including the IMR in the regression of interest prevents possible bias in our 
coefficient estimates and is a standard approach to account for sample selection bias.
22 For 
brevity, these results are not reported. In no case is the IMR coefficient statistically significant 
and, assuming the probit equations were correctly specified, sample selection bias may be 
rejected. More importantly, the coefficient estimates on the other explanatory factors, both 
control and crises variables are very similar to those reported in table 5.  
 
Section 6. Out of Sample Growth Forecasts for the 1998 East Asian Crisis 
Table 7 presents the predicted values for output growth for the five East Asian countries 
that experienced a severe financial crisis in 1997 and large output contractions in 1998—
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. These predictions are for 1998 output 
growth rates and are based on 1997 values of the explanatory variables and the coefficient 
estimates obtained from the model presented in column (4) of Table 5. Predicted values are 22 
 
decomposed into: (a) domestic factors (lagged output growth, change in budget surplus, credit 
growth, and country-specific effects), (b) external-structural factors (external growth, real 
exchange rate overvaluation and openness), (c) the currency, banking, and twin crisis effects.  
Predicted output growth for all 5 countries is close to zero in 1998—small negative 
predictions for Indonesia and Thailand and small positive predictions for Korea, Malaysia and the 
Philippines. The forecast errors (unexpected declines in output) are therefore very large. The 
significant negative effect exerted by the crisis variables is dominated by a strong positive 
domestic effect – mainly a history of very strong growth in the region and the consequently large 
country-specific effects-- and a modestly supportive external-structural growth environment.  
It appears that the depth of the East Asian output collapse in 1998 is much greater than 
could have been expected based on the average effect of financial crises on emerging markets in 
the post Bretton-Woods period. Our research suggests that currency, banking and twin crises only 
explain a small part of the collapse of output observed in these countries. There appears to have 
been a common shock or common vulnerability in these countries-- unobserved in this model-- 
causing the unexpectedly large collapse in output. Alternatively, the effects of the crisis may have 
impacted output in the region much faster than generally occurs, i.e. the lagged effect of a typical 
crisis may have manifested earlier in the East Asian case. This could also explain the short but 
sharp duration of the recession in most East Asian countries at the time.  
 
Section 7. Conclusions 
Despite the popular perception, we find no support for the conjecture that twin crises exert 
especially large output costs in emerging-market economies. The cost of either a currency or a 
banking crisis is highly significant and, taken together, is of course even larger. But twin crises 23 
 
do not contribute any additional (marginal) negative impact on output growth. In particular, we 
find that currency (banking) crises are very damaging, reducing output by about 5-8 (8-10) 
percent over a two-four year period. The combined effect of the two crises occurring 
simultaneously is therefore about 13-18 percent of output. These are very large estimates of 
output losses, and should alarm policymakers, particularly in light of the robustness of the 
empirical results to model specification and estimation technique 
Nonetheless, twin crises are “bad” only in that they entail output losses associated with 
both currency and banking crises, apparently not because additional feedback or interactive 
effects further damage the economy. And the cumulative effects of a currency, banking and twin 
crisis also do not satisfactorily explain the deep recessions in East Asia in 1998.  
If not due to a twin crisis, what then is responsible for the massive output losses seen in 
East Asia? First, we do not entirely discount twin crises—or at least the combined effect of a 
currency and a banking crisis—since it is possible that the cumulative effects occurring over a 2-
4 year period may have manifested sooner. This is not typical for the response of economies to 
financial crises, but is possible. A second explanation lies elsewhere, perhaps a common 
unobserved shock hitting the region that lowered expectations of long-run growth potential and 
investment. This shock may be linked in turn to international capital markets that become 
virtually dysfunctional in the face of a financial crisis and perhaps overreact by reversing capital 
flows entirely. However, these are conjunctures beyond the scope of this article. The underlying 
cause of the depth of the East Asian recession remains an open question.  
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Standard  51 (9%) 
Currency crisis episodes b 
Major 42  (8%) 
       Currency crisis years  Standard  68 (12%) 
Standard  33 (7%) 
Banking Crisis episodes 
Major 21  (4%) 
       Banking crisis years  Standard  105 (21%) 
Twin Crisis episodes c  Standard  20 (3%) 
a The number in parentheses is the percent of total observations in the sample associated 
  with each type of crisis.  
b A standard crisis is defined as a deviation of the currency pressure index of more 
than 2 standard deviations from the country-specific mean (3SD for major crises). 
See text for details on banking crises. 
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a chi square probability of independence of the two series in parenthesis. 
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Type of Crisis 
t-2 t-1  t  t+1  t+2 
 
A. Currency Crises 
Currency  4.0 2.7 1.4 1.7 3.6* 
currency  (no  banking)  3.6 2.4 1.9 1.7 3.6* 
Real GDP 
growth rate 
(%)  Twin (currency and banking)  4.3 4.9  0.7***  1.0 2.1 
Currency  -1.2 -1.4 -1.1 -1.0 -1.1 
currency (no banking)  -0.9  -1.1  -1.2  -1.2  -1.2 
Change in 
budget 
surplus (%)  Twin (currency and banking)  -1.4 -2.1 -1.1 -1.9 -0.5 
Currency  30.5 31.6 36.3 43.4 42.0 
currency (no banking)  28.1  25.9  23.8  33.0  35.0 
Inflation rate 
(%) 
Twin (currency and banking)  43.2 53.2 67.9 57.6 50.1 
Currency 8.0  14.7*  1.6***  -6.8**  -4.3 
currency (no banking)  12.1  18.1  4.1***  -6.7***  -4.8 
RER over- 
valuation 
measure  Twin (currency and banking)  -0.4 7.4 3.0 4.0 -2.8 
 
B. Banking Crises 
Real GDP growth rate (%)  5.1  5.1  1.0***  5.9***  6.5 
Change in budget surplus (%)  -0.5 -1.3 -0.8 -0.4 -0.2 
Inflation rate (%)  29.7  32.5  33.6  29.0  26.5 
RER overvaluation measure  1.5  8.3*  4.1  -6.5***  -3.7 
a *, **, and *** denote rejection of same mean as the number to the left with 10, 5 and 1 percent 
confidence levels. 30 
 
Table 4 - Output Growth and Currency Crises – Benchmark 
a 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (Hausman-Taylor Estimation)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 






























































Currency crises onset dummy - lead (t+2)       -0.457 
(-0.66) 
Currency crises onset dummy - lead (t+1)       -1.558** 
(-2.21) 




























Adjusted R2   b  0.27 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.33 
Number of observations  374 374 373 370 370 
Correlation of error terms  0.09 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.12 
a The regression in column (2) uses a ‘no window’ definition of crises instead of the ‘onset’ variable used in columns (3)-
(5). 
b The Adjusted R
2 reported is for the fixed-effects least squares stage in the Hausman-Taylor procedure. 31 
 
Table 5 - Output Growth, Banking Crises and Twin Crises 
Dependent Variable: real GDP growth rate (Hausman-Taylor Estimation)
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Currency crises dummy (t)    -2.427*** 
(-4.28) 
-2.363*** 
(-4.09)   






Leading Banking crises dummy 
(t+1) 
    0.467 
(0.58) 








Banking crises dummy (t-1)      0.809 
(0.87) 




Adjusted R2  0.34 0.47 0.45 0.41 
Number of observations  342 333 333 333 
Correlation of error terms  0.22 0.24 0.25 0.22 
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 Table 6 – Output Growth – Robustness Tests 
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Sample  280 280 280 574 574 333 
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Indonesia  5.15  0.56 -4.22 -2.96 -0.56 -2.03  -14.16 
Korea  5.37 0.89 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 0.90 -6.92 
Malaysia  5.81 0.62 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 1.05 -7.65 
Philippines  5.95 0.59 -1.85 -2.96 -0.56 1.17 -0.54 




Data for Banking and Currency Crises 
  Banking Crisis  Currency Crisis  Twin Crisis 
Argentina 1980-1982,  1989-1990,  1995-1997  1975-1976, 1982-1983, 1989-1991  1980, 1989 
Brazil  1990, 1994-1997  1982-1983, 1987, 1990-1991, 1995  1990, 1994 
Chile 1976,  1981-1983  1985     
China, P.R.: Hong Kong  1982-1986       
Columbia 1982-1987  1985     
Costa Rica  1987, 1994-1997  1981    
Cyprus          
Indonesia  1994, 1997  1978, 1983, 1986, 1997  1997 
Jordan  1989-1990  1983, 1987-1989, 1992  1989 
Korea 1997  1980,  1997  1997 
Malaysia  1985-1988, 1997  1986, 1997  1985, 1997 
Malta     1992, 1997    
Mauritius 1996  1979,  1981     
Mexico  1981-1991, 1995-1997  1976, 1982, 1985, 1994-1995  1981, 1995 
Panama  1988-1989       
Philippines  1981-1987, 1997  1983-1984, 1986, 1997  1981, 1997 
Singapore 1982  1975     
South Africa  1977, 1985, 1989  1975, 1978, 1984-1986, 1996  1977, 1985 
Thailand  1983-1987, 1997  1981, 1984, 1997  1983, 1997 
Trinidad & Tobago  1982-1993  1985, 1988, 1993    
Tunisia 1991-1995  1993     
Turkey  1982-1985, 1991, 1994-1995  1978-1980, 1994  1994 
Uruguay 1981-1984  1982-1983  1981 





                                                             
1 A traditional view of currency crises, however, is that, with wage and price rigidities, a sharp nominal 
devaluation would produce a real depreciation in the short-run, increase exports and stimulate 
employment and output. Indeed, a sharp devaluation in the past was often accompanied by accusations 
that a country was pursuing a “beggar thy neighbour” policy and “exporting” unemployment. 
2 Allen and Gale (1998), by contrast, show that financial sector crises may be “optimal” from a welfare 
point of view, increasing long-run efficiency and growth in the economy as they are used as a mechanism 
to optimally distribute risk. 
3 Indeed, only Bordo et al. (2001) address the potential effects of a twin crisis. They look at a cross-section 
of countries in recession and focuses on whether the costs of financial crises are the same today as over 
the century ending in 1971 (the collapse of Bretton Woods). 
4 It is noteworthy, however, that Barro (2001) also finds that the currency (banking) crisis is followed by a 
0.6 (0.9) percentage point and statistically significant rise in average output growth during the subsequent 
5-year period. The net effect is an average 0.2 percentage point decline in output growth per year over the 
decade when a currency crisis coincides with a banking crisis. 
5 The equivalent results for their 1880-1997 sample are 14.8%, 3.2% and 7.8% respectively. 
6 In the final step all variables are transformed by:   vit*  =  vit  -  (1 - θ i) i v  where  θ i  =  
2 2
2




where vit denotes any of the aforementioned variables and  i v denotes a group mean and the variance 
components are the one obtained in first two steps. For exact details on the motivation and estimation 
procedure, see Greene (2001) and Hausman and Taylor (1981). 
7 Assuming any of the other control variables is not exogenous does not change our empirical results 
8 For a detailed survey of asymptotic consistency results and GMM estimation methods casting doubts on 
some of the results in this literature, see Arellano and Honoré (forthcoming) and Bond et al. (2001). 
9 We use the Limdep software suite in all our estimations. We thank Professor William Greene for providing 
us with a update of the LINDEP package and the statistical procedure to estimate the GMM model.   
10 Our currency pressure measure of crises does not include episodes of defence involving sharp rises in 
interest rates. Data for market-determined interest rates are not available for much of the sample period in 
many of the countries in our dataset. 
11 This approach differs from that of Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999), for example, who deal with episodes 
of hyperinflation by separating the nominal exchange rate depreciation observations for each country 
according to whether or not inflation in the previous 6 months was greater than 150 percent, and they 
calculate for each sub-sample separate standard deviation and mean estimates with which to define 
exchange rate crisis episodes. 
12Other studies defining the threshold of large changes in terms of country-specific moments include 
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999); Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Esquivel and Larrain 
(1998). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) use a three standard deviation cut-off. While the choice of cut-off 
point is somewhat arbitrary, Frankel and Rose (1996) suggest that the results are not very sensitive to the 
precise cut-off chosen in selecting crisis episodes. Our output equation estimates using “major” currency 
crises, evaluated with the 3-standard deviation threshold, are very similar to the benchmark crisis measure. 
13 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) identify banking sector distress as a situation where one of the 
following conditions hold: ratio of non-performing assets to total assets is greater than 2 percent of GDP; 
cost of the rescue operation was at least 2 percent of GDP; banking sector problems resulted in a large 
scale nationalization of banks; and extensive bank runs took place or emergency measures such as deposit 
freezes, prolonged bank holidays, or generalized deposit guarantees were enacted by the government in 
response to the crisis. Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) do not offer a systematic identification scheme but 
rely on expert opinions solicited from varied sources. They identify a systemic crisis as one in which 36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
“much or all of bank capital [was] being exhausted”. Arteta and Eichengreen (forthcoming) compare these 
sources and others and conclude that their empirical results do not depend on the banking identification 
scheme used.  
14 The 'openness' variable is defined as the sum of imports and exports relative to GDP. Real exchange rate 
overvaluation is defined as deviations from a fitted trend in the real trade weighted exchange rate. The real 
trade-weighted exchange rate is the trade-weighted sum of the bilateral real exchange rates (defined in 
terms of CPI indices) against the U.S. dollar, the German mark, and the Japanese yen. The trade-weights 
are based on the average bilateral trade with the United States, the European Union, and Japan in 1980 and 
1990. 
15 This result is consistent with the find, reported in Glick and Hutchison (2000), that causality is more 
likely to run from banking to currency crises and not, as is sometimes portrayed for the turmoil in East 
Asia, from a currency crisis to a systemic banking failure. 
16 While not presented here, the same is true for credit growth rates. Foreign interest rates typically rise 
about 100 basis points on average and foreign growth rates decline modestly surrounding currency crises. 
17 Interestingly, both the coefficients on the lead and lag of banking crises are insignificantly different 
from zero as well. 
18 The sample here is somewhat smaller than the one used in the results reported in Tables 4 and 5. The 
GMM estimator poses both data restrictions and restrictions on the models that could be estimated with 
our data (because of insufficient variation of the ‘twin’ variable within individual countries). 
19 We also restricted our sample for non-OECD countries with a population of more than one million. 
20 See, for example, Honohan and Klingebiel (2000) for estimates of the fiscal costs of banking crises. 
These might be construed, though, as involving only a transfer of resources and not imposing real costs on 
the economy. 
21 The exact specifications of the probit regressions are taken from Glick and Hutchison, 2001. Details 
available from the authors upon request 
22 For a survey of sample selection correction methodologies see Blundell and Costa Días, 2000. 
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